Why a 'historic' legal case may provide some lessons for modern environmental crimes law.

By Persijn (Percy) De Vries

A 1947 United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) case, the ‘Polish Forestry Case’[1], may potentially hold lessons for modern environmental crimes law and policy. While gaps in this case’s evidence remain it could in turn inform modern environmental crimes policymaking.

Image by Steven Kamenar, here.

The context, UNWCC  

Established during WWII, the allied powers together with various European governments-in-exile sought to draw up a justice framework to hold axis war criminals to account. Spurred on by reports of atrocities being committed across Europe, Africa, and Asia the greater powers cemented this objective in the 1943 Moscow Declaration[2]. This in turn led to the creation of the Commission which would bring charges against more than 36,000 individuals in over 8000 cases across its 17 member states post-war until its closure 1948[3]. These included lower and mid-ranking officials, therefore by a multitude more than the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the latter concentrating on high-ranking officials only.

The Commission’s closure and classification in light of the escalating cold war effectively ‘buried’ various of its cases and their precedents till declassification four decades later[4]. In the post-cold war world in the creation of the ad-hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the build-up to the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), their legacy was largely overlooked. Read more about that in the footnotes, sources to explain linked[5].

The case and the problem, Ecocide

Deliberate or inadvertent destruction of the environment as a tool of war has been a fact throughout recorded history. This differs from destruction stemming from peacetime economic activity, which this article excludes from its consideration, but isn’t ultimately exclusive to this context. As in the context Polish Forestry Case[6] and others, destruction of the natural world is simultaneously a tactic of warfare itself as it is one to sustain an occupation during a conflict.

The most prolific recent examples of Ecocide include damage stemming from the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam and Cambodia by the U.S. during the Vietnam war[7], or the 2023 damage caused by the Kakhovka dam’s destruction in the Ukraine war[8]. Widespread ruin isn’t merely limited to the natural environment and has profound spill-over consequences that pervade into the livelihood of communities surrounding it and globally.

It’s also an issue that until recently was poorly monitored, and remains a fact due to the lack of international and national-level rules or criminal sanctions that can act as a deterrence. Much to the dismay of various governments, international organisations, and civil society groups. This being the fundamental founding ‘call to action’ for the Stop Ecocide International group (SEI) founded in 2021[9].

SEI calls primarily for the amendment of the ICC’ Statute to be amended to include a ‘fifth crime’ of Ecocide, to accord it prominence, legal, and political effect[10]. The current international rules, as set out in the ENMOD and API[11], are often criticised as being too vague or set the bar ‘too high’ for the effective bringing of a prosecution and trial[12]. Domestic-based rules aren’t adopted universally either, with different statutes and cases providing inconsistent rulesets globally[13].   

Current overarching geopolitical conditions however make such ambitions difficult to achieve and limited in their potential impact long-term. While institutions such as the ICC remain vital forums for transitional justice, their impact is limited by the lack of greater power signatories it has, and the lack of compliance with its orders it can enforce even on its members[14]. Symbolically the codification of Ecocide in the Rome Statute would be significant, in practice however it would unlikely lead to many prosecutions for this crime. In this specific context the Polish Forestry Case could therefore in addition provide a possible complimentary solution.

Why care? And why ‘international’?

Destruction in war is often cross-border by its character and environmental disasters don’t stop human-drawn boundaries either. Take the fallout from numerous war and peacetime environmental disasters such as Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, the Kakhovka Dam, and Agent Orange among others. If there ever was or is a ‘call to action’ in this regard, this fact overrides all else. That if there is to be a ‘fix’, it must be coordinated internationally.

What’s special about this case?

This case could be the earliest recorded prosecution of an environmental crime, premised on damage to the environment in of itself, going beyond mere charges based on pillage and destruction of public property. At least insofar recorded history can attest, of course excluding any possible other legal archives worldwide that could rebut this point.

It’s important to highlight that latter fact, as we’re unsure if another tribunal or organisation such as the UNWCC has tried an environmental crime before Poland’s Forestry Case. Legal historians James Mark and Phil Clark make this point in illustrating how an inclination in post-WWII Western-sourced literature created ‘bias’ toward assuming Nuremberg Tribunal top-down imposed justice constitutes best practice[15]. That consequently this represents only and best form of post-conflict justice available and therefore overlooks all alternative methods from other historical sources (see more here for the ‘Nuremberg paradigm’). Partly deliberately, and as other archives may not be accessible or translated into European languages. Ultimately therefore we can’t be sure if this case is really the ‘first one’.

Second, it matters that the crime was additionally premised on environmental destruction as an end of itself. The case’s charge sheet and attributing evidence set out grounds that extend beyond mere pillaging of an economic resource, here being the felled forests (timber)[16]. While no known precedent existed in 1947 when this case was filed, prosecutors submitted the charges on existing provisions in international law on excessive resource pillaging in military occupation[17]. No statute law on the use of environment existed in the 1940s, the fact that therefore they premised the charges on damage in of itself absent potential economic damage, is additionally significant. As seen in the files recording how environmental damage [done by the Nazi occupiers] was itself damaging to the ‘hydrobiological conditions of the country [Poland]’[18], and significant enough to enact long-lasting changes to the forests overall.

Missing evidence as often blights UNWCC cases’ credibility, threatening to undermine their credibility. Much is made by historians and observers of this forum’s shortcoming in its incomplete evidence[19]. Stemming largely from its deliberate classification by the U.S. and Britain in 1948, many of its files remain incomplete today[20]. That inhibits a complete assessment on whether these trials were in fact conducted to a ‘fair standard’ and in turn whether they can be reputable sources for modern-day lawmaking. Numerous examples of racially-incentivised bias, trials being conducted (as is the case with this one) in Soviet ‘satellite states’ not known to adopt ‘fair trial’ standards, and accusation of potentially retributive justice[21], blight its record.

While these dilemmas exist they don’t detract from the fact that the UNWCC remains a successful example of how multilateral compatible with minimal input transitional justice can be achieved. Little direct input was given the Soviet Union[22], and it executed cases despite American and British reluctance to support it[23], thanks in large part to efforts undertaken by its smaller members[24]. Additionally the fact that prosecution charges were ‘reviewed’ by the Commission before receiving an ‘approval’ for their go-ahead, further incentivised (even ‘Soviet satellites states’) to adhere to universal standards[25]. Despite some blemishes on its record, these don’t detract from its overall achievement to facilitate numerous war crimes trials. For example several instances of malicious or baseless charges were dismissed by the Commission throughout its existence[26]. A notable instance of racial bias took place in a British military tribunal in Hong Kong[27].

What real-world ‘lessons’ can be derived?

If justice can be delivered for environmental crimes via this method, why couldn’t that extend to other war crimes in a [now current] multipolar international order? This would be between a smaller group of states exercising universal jurisdiction in their domestic courts, via an overarching horizontally complimentary organisation such as the UNWCC. While it doesn’t derive from the significance that would be accorded an Ecocide amendment to the ICC Statute, a regional approach could end up realistically achieving its codification and enactment in law. Especially in a world where the court lacks legitimacy among the greater powers (U.S. and China) and has waning ability to enforce its decisions. This ties in with a wider context in which worldwide institutions such as those of the UN, G20, and IMF have become less significant forums for diplomacy and resolutions. Relying therefore only on an international court to direct justice for current and future war crimes isn’t enough to guarantee it’s delivery. The UNWCC’s example could for instance be realistically replicable in Europe post-Ukraine war or elsewhere to deliver desired post-conflict justice, therefore demonstrating a particular salience from this case and its context.

Why care?

Is it realistic to expect post-conflict justice mechanisms to exist? When society prioritises and desires above all else peace, is it right to ‘push’ for this and the prosecution of environmental crimes with it? The simple answer is yes.

True and lasting peace can’t exist without some form of justice being applied, making transitional justice core to it. The long tail of a conflict requires some form of settlement to be applied for the victims and survivors of it, lest that be turned into resentment or grow into hatred of former enemies who they may have to live alongside for the rest of their lives. Take for example post-WWI Europe.

In that same vein deliberate or reckless destruction of the natural environment that underpins all natural and ultimately human life, needs to be accounted for; think of agricultural systems that feed humanity which are in turn dependent on wide ranging natural ecosystems. We have only one planet after all.

Therefore giving form to this aim via a real tried example may in addition to ICC Statute amendment be useful to the cause.  While ultimately this case and its wider forum had its various flaws, it provides a useful ‘template’ for how future cases for environmental crimes and other war crimes could be tried.

[1] UNWCC.org https://unwcc.org/about/; and UNWCC (1948) “The History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War” https://unwcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/UNWCC-history.pdf (can also be found at unwcc.org), at p.496.

[2] Holocaust Encyclopaedia. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/timeline-event/holocaust/1942-1945/moscow-declaration 

[3] UNWCC.org https://unwcc.org/about/; and UNWCC (1948) “The History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War” https://unwcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/UNWCC-history.pdf (can also be found at unwcc.org)

[4] Same as footnote 3.

[5] Read following articles: Dan Plesch (2017) “Human rights after Hitler” https://www-jstor-org.soas.idm.oclc.org/stable/j.ctt1n2txqz; Christopher Simpson (2014) “Shutting down the United Nations War Crimes Commission” https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/crimlfm25&div=9&id=&page= ; Dan Plesch and Leah Owen (2024) “The United Nations War Crimes Commission 1943 – 1948: A forgotten highway to postconflict justice?” https://humanityjournal.org/issue-15-1/the-united-nations-war-crimes-commission-1943-1948-a-forgotten-highway-to-postconflict-justice/ 

[6] UNWCC.org https://unwcc.org/about/; and UNWCC (1948) “The History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War” https://unwcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/UNWCC-history.pdf (can also be found at unwcc.org) specifically p.496 at “(XV) Destruction of Polish Forests as a War Crime”

[7] Aspen Institute “What is Agent Orange?” here; The Guardian (2012) “US to clean up toxic Agent Orange residue 40 years after Vietnam war” here

[8] The Guardian (2025) “Destruction of Ukraine dam caused ‘toxic timebomb’ of heavy metals, study finds here; BBC News (2023) “Ukraine dam: What we know about the Nova Kakhova incident” here

[9] Stop Ecocide International (About) https://www.stopecocide.earth/ecocide-law

[10] Stop Ecocide International (Legal Definition) https://www.stopecocide.earth/legal-definition

[11] Convention on the prohibition of military or any hostile use of environmental modification techniques 1976 (“ENMOD”) accessible via the Red Cross here; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (“API”) accessible via the Red Cross here.

[12] Stop Ecocide International (About) https://www.stopecocide.earth/ecocide-law and “Legal Definition” here; Rachel Killean and Damien Short (2023) “A critical defence of the crime of Ecocide” here; Clara Ellenbeck (2025) “Ecocide: A critical and constructive approach to establishing a fifth crime against peace” here; and a complete reading list accessible here via “Ecocide Law” https://ecocidelaw.com/bibliography/ 

[13] Ecocide Law “Existing and Proposed Ecocide Laws” https://ecocidelaw.com/existing-ecocide-laws/ 

[14] See Mongolia, EJIL (2025) Kazuki Goto “The Conclusion of Mongolia’s Proceedings before the International Criminal Court: Implication on Non-Cooperation” here; Politico (2024) “Sorry not sorry, says Mongolia after failure to arrest Putin” https://www.politico.eu/article/mongolia-failure-arrest-vladimir-putin-international-warrant-international-criminal-court/ 

[15] James Mark and Phil Clark, “Not Nuremberg—Histories of Alternative Criminalization Paradigms, 1945–2021: An Introduction” (2024). https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2024.a941435 

[16] UNWCC Archives, Reel 18, p.853-857, https://unwcc.org/unwcc-archives/

[17] Same as footnote 16.

[18] Same as footnote 16.  

[19] Mark Ellis (2014) “Assessing the impact of the United Nations War Crimes Commission on the principle of complementarity and fair trial standards” https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10609-014-9221-4.

[20] Same as footnote 19.  

[21] Same as footnote 19.

[22] Valentyna Polunina (2022) “ The Absent Player: The Soviet Union and the genesis of allied war crimes trials program, 1941-1943”

[23] Christopher Simpson (2014) “Shutting down the United Nations War Crimes Commission” here 

[24] Sabina Ferhadbegovic, Kerstin von Lingen, and Julia Eichenberg (2022) “The United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), 1943 – 1948, and the Codification of International Criminal Law: An Introduction to the Special Issue here

[25] Dan Plesch and Leah Owen (2024) “The United Nations War Crimes Commission 1943 – 1948: A forgotten highway to postconflict justice?” https://humanityjournal.org/issue-15-1/the-united-nations-war-crimes-commission-1943-1948-a-forgotten-highway-to-postconflict-justice/

[26] Dan Plesch (2017) “Human rights after Hitler” https://www-jstor-org.soas.idm.oclc.org/stable/j.ctt1n2txqz

[27] Mark Ellis (2014) “Assessing the impact of the United Nations War Crimes Commission on the principle of complementarity and fair trial standards” https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10609-014-9221-4.